I. INTRODUCTION
The reality of today's globalization means that goods and services cross national borders with regularity. Such market globalization "is in stark contrast" to the locus for "intellectual property rights, which are still national in nature." 1 Every national system of intellectual property has different characteristics and protections, and understanding all of those systems, including their varying requirements and degrees of protection, can be very costly and challenging to businesses involved in international transactions. 2 Patents in particular are a highly territorial form of intellectual property, both because "most inventions [are] tangible in nature and because patents are subject to extensive review by a national government prior to . . . being granted." 3 The historically territorial limits in patent law, however, are now being challenged by the increasingly frequent patenting of "intangible inventions, such as business methods and software." 4 Patented inventions today frequently "transcend national borders," putting patent owners in the position of having to protect their assets under multiple systems. 5 This state of affairs has led to an increased interest in and importance of intellectual property law at the international level. 6 International treaties, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), have been signed in an effort to harmonize the various national intellectual property laws. 7 Harmonization of intellectual property laws makes the law generally uniform from country to country and thus reduces businesses' transaction costs of evaluating those laws in all the countries in which they would like to seek protection. 8 Efforts to harmonize patent law, however, have not led to a perfect solution. Harmonization does not remedy the problem of enforcement of patent rights, which "would require litigation in each and every coun- No. 5] "OFFER TO SELL" INFRINGEMENT 1757 try where there is infringement." 9 This can be costly to businesses and requires patent owners to predict where patent infringement might take place. 10 If patent owners do not correctly anticipate where they will need protection and do not seek a patent in a certain country, then they will not be able to enforce patents in that location. 11 Additionally, most of the efforts to harmonize intellectual property laws have simply set floors of protection that signatory nations must meet, allowing for national variation above the minimum level of protection.
12
With U.S. patent law taking on an ever more international perspective, 13 and with the difficulties faced by businesses that would like protection of their intellectual property internationally, it is increasingly important that the proper territorial scope and reach of patent laws be better defined. The question of the exact territorial reach of U.S. patent law is particularly pertinent to transnational "offer to sell" infringement liability.
14 It is well understood that infringement liability is incurred when there is an offer made in the United States to sell a patented invention in the United States, when the offer is made by someone other than the patent owner or another entity authorized by the patent owner. 15 Because of the presumption against extraterritoriality, however-whereby U.S. law generally may not be applied outside of the U.S.-usually no "offer to sell" infringement liability is incurred when there is an offer outside of the United States to sell a U.S.-patented invention outside of the United States. 16 Infringement liability, however, is not obvious with transnational "offers to sell:" Does an offer made in the United States to sell a patented invention outside of the United States (i.e., the location of the contemplated sale is outside of the United States) constitute an act of patent 9. Id 13. Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 6, at 705-06. 14. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.").
15. In this scenario, there is no question that the language of § 271(a) applies. Id.; cf. Holbrook, Territoriality, supra note 6, at 726-31 (describing the uncertainty surrounding whether "offers to sell" in the United States, but with completed sales outside the United States, violated U.S. patent law).
16. The presumption against extraterritoriality states that the laws of the United States only apply within the United States. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650 (1915) ("The right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its Territories and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.") (citation omitted); Jane C. Ginsburg, Comment, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 587-88 (1997) ("Extraterritorial application of U.S. law . . . is highly suspect, if not illegitimate, unless clearly authorized by Congress. . . . Extraterritoriality . . . means the application of one country's laws to events occurring outside that country's borders."); see also infra note 207. UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2012 infringement? 17 Relatedly, what if the offer is made outside of the United States, but the contemplated location of the sale is inside the United States? The Federal Circuit has only very recently addressed this latter issue. In Transocean v. Maersk, 18 the court held that when two U.S. companies make an offer in a foreign country, contemplating a sale in the United States, there is potential liability for "offer to sell" infringement under § 271(a) of the U.S. Patent Act. 19 The court did not directly address, however, other potential scenarios, such as what should occur when the companies are not from the United States. Thus, although the territorial scope of "offer to sell" infringement is clearer now than it has been in the past, questions still remain. 20 In an effort to provide some clarity to the question of the scope of "offer to sell" infringement, this Note proposes the adoption and application of a clear rule to all "offer to sell" transnational patent infringement cases. The rule, dubbed the "Location of the Contemplated Sale" rule, clearly defines the bounds of "offer to sell" infringement under § 271(a) and specifies that the location of the contemplated sale should control when deciding whether there is "offer to sell" infringement. According to the rule, if the location of the contemplated sale is within the United States, then there is potential for infringement under § 271(a). If the location of the contemplated sale is outside of the United States, then there is no potential for infringement. This rule extends the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in Transocean, providing a clear guide in all situations, while respecting the policies underlying § 271(a) "offer to sell" infringement.
This Note begins by providing a background on "offer to sell" patent infringement. Part II presents the origin and legislative history of the "offer to sell" provision of the patent infringement statute and highlights the difficulties of finding a proper interpretation of this provision. Part III discusses "offer to sell" infringement in the courts, addressing the development of its interpretation, both at the district court and Federal Circuit level. Further, Part III lays out the different and conflicting interpretations and applications of the statute. Part IV explains the "Location of the Contemplated Sale" rule proposed by this Note and outlines how it accords with Federal Circuit precedent, the underlying policies of "offer to sell" infringement, and the principles of extraterritoriality. Part IV also shows how this rule would better define the bounds of "offer to sell" infringement. This Part presents the development of the patent infringement statute that today includes "offer to sell" infringement. First, Section A discusses the statute's initial enactment in 1952 to its most recent amendment in 1994 (the codification of the current infringement statute, found in 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)). Second, Section B discusses difficulties with the interpretation and application of § 271(a), primarily due to a lack of legislative guidance.
A. From the Patent Act of 1952 to the TRIPS Agreement in 1994
In 1952, Congress enacted the Patent Act with the intent to codify the common law governing patents.
21
The Patent Act included § 271, which described what types of actions constituted patent infringement.
22
At that time, § 271 stated that "whoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . infringes the patent." 23 The statute reflected the fact that patent rights are territorial by requiring that all infringing activities occur within the United States.
24
For over thirty years following the enactment of the Patent Act, "Congress made no revisions to § 271 . . . leaving the development of infringement law to the courts." 25 In 1984, 1988, and 1992, Congress amended § 271 to provide ever more exclusive rights to patentees. 26 In some of these amendments, Congress statutorily overruled holdings of the courts. 27 Other amendments clarified the statutes and closed loopholes. 28 The changes included protection from export out of the United States of "either the complete but disassembled [ vention" 30 and protection from import into the United States of an invention that was manufactured abroad by a patented process.
31
Since the nineteenth century, the international community has worked toward harmonizing intellectual property laws across countries.
32
In the past few decades, though, the effort to harmonize has been especially strong. 33 In 1994, Congress amended § 271(a), (c), (e), and (g) to include two new types of acts that would constitute patent infringement: offering to sell and importing a patented invention. 34 The enactment of these two new types of infringing activities was in response to the requirements of the most significant 35 of the harmonization efforts, 1994's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).
36
TRIPS is an international treaty on intellectual property that was adopted at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations for revision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
37 TRIPS was a major step forward in the process of harmonizing international intellectual property laws, as it established a uniform framework of international standards and required that all signatory countries establish minimum exclusive rights for patent owners. 38 Unfortunately, the amendments to U.S. intellectual property law required by TRIPS occurred "with little discussion and, as such, there is no legislative history to inform the . . . bounds of" "offer to sell" infringement at that time. 35. Duffy, supra note 33, at 688. 36. TRIPS, supra note 12, art. 28, ¶ 1 ("A patent shall confer on its owner the following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product . . . .").
37 This infringement statute-particularly the "offer to sell" provision-and the scope and bounds of "offer to sell" infringement is the primary focus of this Note.
43

B. Difficulties with "Offer to Sell" Infringement
Lacking any legislative history, the "offer to sell" provision brings with it little guidance for courts that must attempt to apply the law to diverse factual circumstances. There are unique problems in defining the scope of the "offer to sell" provision. In contrast to the previous version of the statute, for there to be infringement under the "offer to sell" provision, there must be an "offer," not just some "creation, utilization, or completed sale" of an infringing item. 44 Before the statutory creation of this form of infringement, courts' primary concern was whether the potentially infringing device fell under the terms of an existing patent. 45 Now, courts must make determinations as to whether an offer has been made, not simply whether the potentially infringing device was actually infringing in and of itself. 46 One potential source is § 271(i), which was added to the statute to comply with the TRIPS agreement and is meant to clarify the meaning of "offer to sell." 49 Section 271(i) states that "[a]s used in this section, an 'offer for sale' or an 'offer to sell' by a person other than the patentee, or any designee of the patentee, is that in which the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of the patent." 50 As with the amendments to § 271(a), Congress provided no guidance on the meaning or purpose of this statute. 51 Nevertheless, the meaning of this provision seems to be clear if read literally: an offer to sell a patented item will be an infringing action if the actual sale is intended to occur before the expiration of the patent. 52 This meaning comports with the statutory twenty-year patent term, outside of which the patentee has no exclusive rights. 53 This "temporal" limitation of § 271(i), however, has been used by courts to justify requirements that the contemplated sale occur not just during the term of the patent but also within the United States. 54 Thus, the limitations of "offer to sell" infringement under § 271(a) are unclear. This has left patent owners and potential litigants with little guidance as to the correct scope of the "offer to sell" infringement provision. In addition, because the provision was enacted relatively recently, both district courts and the Federal Circuit have wrestled with the statute, attempting to come to the correct meaning and scope of "offer to sell" infringement.
55
A number of important policies are implicated in the question of whether an offer made in the United States to sell a U.S.-patented invention abroad constitutes infringement. Some courts have held that when the location of the contemplated sale is outside of the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality would be violated if infringement liability were found. 56 This view is an outgrowth of a particular interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) that requires an infringing "sale" if there is to be an infringing "offer to sell." 57 Other courts have held that there is in- (2) (stating that the patent term ends twenty years from the date on which the patent application was filed). The addition of § 271(i) seems to have the effect of preventing the patent holder from achieving an extension of the patent term by preventing the holder from claiming infringement for sales that occur outside of the twenty-year window. For additional discussion of the meaning of § 271(i), see Holbrook fringement liability when the location of the contemplated sale is outside of the United States. 58 These courts argue that to hold to the contrary would, among other things, defeat one of the purposes of "offer to sell" infringement: to protect the economic interests of patent owners by excluding offers within the United States. 59 Courts have generally been divided on the issue of the proper scope of "offer to sell" infringement, 60 and with limited guidance from the Federal Circuit, patent owners are left with a lack of clarity as to what actions do and do not implicate infringement liability under the "offer to sell" infringement statute.
61
Without congressional legislation to clarify the intended transnational scope of the "offer to sell" infringement provision, district courts, the Federal Circuit, and perhaps even the Supreme Court, will be left to decide the issue. The extent of liability for offers to sell will have to be determined after consideration of the many competing policies that are persuasive both for and against a more transnational reach of U.S. patent laws.
III. ANALYSIS: "OFFER TO SELL" INFRINGEMENT IN THE COURTS
Since "offer to sell" infringement was only added to § 271 in 1994, courts have not had many opportunities to address and clearly define its scope. This Part addresses, however, how courts have in fact dealt with "offer to sell" infringement in the past. First, the Note discusses the development of "offer to sell" infringement in the Federal Circuit, from the originating focus on personal jurisdiction to the later focus on the actual scope of the statute.
62
This discussion includes an analysis of the most recent Federal Circuit case on "offer to sell" infringement, Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc. 63 In Transocean, the Federal Circuit provides some clarification as to the scope of "offer to sell" infringement, but nonetheless leaves a number of questions unanswered. Second, this Part discusses the development of "offer to sell" jurisprudence in the district courts. 64 With limited guidance from the Federal Circuit, district courts have struggled to establish the proper scope of the "offer to sell" provision, resulting in conflicting conclusions. 
A. Development of "Offer to Sell" Infringement in the Federal Circuit
This Section discusses the development of the scope of "offer to sell" infringement in the Federal Circuit. The narrowing focus of the Federal Circuit on the particular scope of "offer to sell" infringement is presented along with the primary policy arguments advanced by the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit's understanding of the policies underlying § 271(a) "offer to sell" infringement are critical because, with the limited precedent in this area, these policies are the foundation on which the district courts have attempted to build their understanding of the proper scope of "offer to sell" infringement and apply it to individual cases. 66 The most recent Federal Circuit case on "offer to sell" infringement is presented in Part III.A.5. 
67
In this case, the court discussed "offer to sell" infringement and the policies underlying it in the context of establishing personal jurisdiction over the alleged infringers.
68 A company located in Virginia sent price quotation letters to a company located in California. 69 The plaintiff alleged that the sending of such letters constituted infringement of its patent in that the letters were an "offer to sell." 70 The question before the court was whether such letters could, in fact, constitute an "offer to sell." 71 The court acknowledged that this was an issue of first impression and found that federal rather than state law controlled the determination as to the meaning of the word "offer." 72 The court discussed the possibility of importing a meaning from another patent statute, 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), 73 to better define the meaning of "offer" in § 271(a). 74 Section 102(b) is referred to as the "on sale" bar in patent law, 75 and it prohibits the granting of a patent if the invention was "on sale" more than one year prior to the application for patent. 76 There is a significant body of case law constru-
67. See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (acknowledging that the case presented an issue of first impression on "offers to sell" after the 1994 amendment to § 271(a)).
68. See, e.g., id. at 1379 ("If we were to permit potential infringers to avoid jurisdiction by denominating what otherwise would be an offer to sell merely by asserting the contrary in the offer, the prohibition added to § 271(a) against offers to sell would be hollow indeed.").
69. ing the meaning of "on sale" in § 102(b). 77 Importantly, the 3D Systems court found that despite the similar language, the construed meaning of "on sale" as contained in the "on sale" bar of § 102(b) should not be imported to § 271(a) in determining the meaning of "offer." 78 The court held that the price quotation letters were indeed "offers to sell" and thus supported the exercise of personal jurisdiction because the cause of action arose out of the contacts with the forum state. 79 The court found that "[a]s a matter of federal statutory construction, the price quotation letters can be regarded as 'offer[s] to sell' under § 271" because they included a "description of the allegedly infringing merchandise and the price at which it can be purchased."
80 Further, with respect to the policy underlying § 271(a) "offers to sell," the court noted that "[o]ne of the purposes of adding 'offer[] to sell' to § 271(a) was to prevent exactly the type of activity [the defendant] has engaged in, i.e., generating interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee."
81
Lacking other guidance, 82 this statement of the policy behind "offer to sell" infringement under § 271(a) has been consistently followed in district courts and Federal Circuit opinions. 83 This policy rationale for the existence of "offer to sell" infringement (i.e., that an "offer to sell" could have an adverse economic impact on the patentee), however, may not be definitive in assisting a court in deciding whether an action should be construed as "offer to sell" infringement when international actions are involved. For example, when the offer is made outside of the United States, contemplating a sale inside or outside of the United States, is there an economic impact or commercial detriment that would justify "offer to sell" infringement? Does the commercial detriment have to be in the United States? These complications were not addressed by the court. 78. 3D Sys., 160 F.3d at 1379 n.4. The court, in discussing the differing policy rationales underlying the two statutes, stated:
We decline to import the authority construing the "on sale" bar of § 102(b) into the "offer to sell" provision of § 271(a). The policy reasons underlying the on-sale prohibition of § 102(b) include the concern that patentees will commercialize their inventions while deferring the beginning of the statutory patent term, encouraging prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions to the public, discouraging the removal of inventions from the public domain when the public has come to rely on their ready availability, and giving investors a reasonable period to discern the potential value of an invention. These policy reasons have no resonance with § 271(a)'s statement of the rights of the patentee to exclude others from making, using, offering to sell, or selling the patented invention. Thus, "offer to sell" under § 271 cannot be treated as equivalent to "on sale" under § 102(b). 
Id. (citation omitted
84
Rotec was the first decision to address the operation of "offer to sell" infringement outside of the personal jurisdiction context. 85 In this case, the Federal Circuit dealt with a situation where the plaintiff-patentee sought to hold the accused infringer liable for making an "offer to sell" in the United States when the contemplated sale would occur outside the United States. 86 It was undisputed in the case that the sale of the patented system would take place in the People's Republic of China and that the system offered for sale would in fact infringe on the plaintiff's patent if sold in the United States. 87 In dispute was whether an "offer to sell" took place in the United States. 88 The court ultimately concluded that the facts did not support an "offer to sell," but the discussion and concurring opinion provide significant guidance on the meaning and application of "offer to sell" infringement.
89
The court reaffirmed the policy underlying "offer to sell" infringement as described in 3D Systems (i.e., "generat[ing] interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee"), 90 and noted that in adding "offers to sell" to the statute, "Congress sought to strengthen the protections afforded under § 271." 91 The court acknowledged, though, that it was unclear "how much strength Congress wished to add to the parameters of a patent grant." 92 The court focused on commercial detriment to the patentee, mostly in the form of "generat[ed] interest," as a means of determining whether there was an "offer to sell."
93 Also, the court concluded that communication with a third party is required for a finding of commercial detriment and that such a requirement is very helpful in balancing the interests of the patentee with the interests of the public. 94 Certain activities do not involve communication to a third party, the court found, and should not contribute to a finding of "offer to sell" infringement even though those activities would potentially generate interest later, such as: "(1) studying a patent in anticipation of its expiration; (2) estimating the cost of producing a disclosed invention before the date of expiration; or (3) The court's decision in Rotec also addressed the territoriality principle in U.S. patent law, stating that "[t]he right conferred by a patent under our law is confined to the United States and its territories, and infringement of this right cannot be predicated of acts wholly done in a foreign country." 97 The majority did not find, however, that there was no "offer to sell" on the grounds that the contemplated sale would have occurred abroad; rather, it applied the territoriality principle to limit the scope of the defendants' activities that would be considered and found that there was inadequate evidence that an offer occurred. 98 Thus, the holding of the majority opinion suggests that the contemplated location of the sale may not be an initial consideration when determining whether there was an "offer to sell."
In her concurring opinion, Judge Newman vigorously disagreed that a domestic offer contemplating a foreign sale could constitute infringement under the statute.
99
She characterized the majority opinion as "necessarily accept[ing] the critical premise that an 'offer to sell' made in the United States can constitute patent infringement even when the contemplated sale could not infringe the patent."
100 She further stated that she "do[es] not believe that 35 U.S.C. § 271 is correctly so interpreted." 101 In her view, under the facts of Rotec, there could be no "offer to sell" because the location of the contemplated sale was outside of the United States.
102
In her concurring opinion, Judge Newman went on to state that "an offer to sell a device or system whose actual sale can not infringe a United States patent is not an infringing act under § 271."
103 Judge Newman cited the language of § 271(i) 104 and argued that "[b]y requiring that the actual sale of the thing offered will occur before the patent expires, the statute makes clear that the sale must be one that will infringe the patent."
105 Differing from the majority and the opinion in 3D Systems, Judge Newman concluded that "[t]he purpose of § 271(a) was to permit a patentee to act against threatened infringing sale by establishing a cause of action before actual sale occurred."
106 This purpose is less expansive than the purpose articulated in 3D Systems and by the Rotec majority because it suggests that "offer to sell" infringement simply serves to give the patentee "the ability to enforce an existing right-to exclude others from selling the patented product-at an earlier time." 107 Despite Judge Newman's concurrence, the Federal Circuit in Rotec did not definitively address the issue of whether "offer to sell" infringement under § 271(a) includes offers in which the contemplated sale would occur outside of the United States. 109 In MEMC, the plaintiff alleged that both an infringing offer and actual infringing sales occurred in the United States, but the court found that neither of the alleged infringing acts took place within the United States. 110 The court followed its previous holdings, stating that "the reach of section 271(a) is limited to infringing activities that occur within the United States" and analyzed the alleged offer under the standard contractual analysis.
111
Notably, although the court found that sales of the patented product took place in a foreign country, it nonetheless analyzed whether there was an "offer to sell."
112 This approach accords with the majority's opinion in Rotec, seemingly indicating that even if the contemplated sale was to take place in a foreign country, the court would consider possible "offer to sell" infringement within the United States.
Despite the court's holding, the opinion in MEMC again omits any definitive answer to the question of whether an offer in the United States 104. As previously noted, § 271(i) states, in part, that an "offer to sell" is one "in which the sale will occur before the expiration of the term of that patent." 35 U.S.C. § 271(i) (2006 113 The appellant argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury and that it "should have charged the jury that an offer in the United States to sell goods outside of the United States would not violate the 'offer to sell' provision of § 271(a)." 114 The court did not definitively address the disputed proper scope of "offer to sell" infringement, but rather held that the district court made no fundamental error and simply stated that "[t]his court has yet to define the full territorial scope of the 'offers to sell' offense in § 271(a)." 115 By holding that it had not defined the territorial scope of "offer to sell" infringement, the court left open the possibility that a domestic offer with a contemplated foreign sale, as well as a foreign offer with a contemplated domestic sale, might constitute infringement under § 271(a). Rather than further clarify the scope of the "offer to sell" infringement, the court in SEB simply asserted that it had not yet fully defined the scope. 116 The Federal Circuit did not address the issue of the scope of "offer to sell" infringement again until its 2010 Transocean decision. 
118
The plaintiff Transocean filed suit against Maersk USA (Maersk) for infringement of three of its patents on an improved apparatus for conducting offshore drilling.
119
Maersk's Danish parent company, Maersk A/S, had contracted with another company to build an offshore drilling rig in Singapore.
120 "Later, The contract signed by the two U.S. companies, Maersk and Statoil, "specified that the 'Operating Area' for the rig was the U.S. Gulf of Mexico but that Statoil had the right to use the rig outside the Operating Area with certain limitations." 123 The lower court held that Transocean's patents were invalid and not infringed. 124 On the issue of infringement, the lower court found that because the "negotiation and signing of the contract took place outside the U.S.," there could be no infringement. 125 The Federal Circuit reversed the finding of invalidity and proceeded to address the issue of infringement. 126 The court began the analysis of the claim of "offer to sell" infringement by following its prior Rotec opinion and applying "traditional contract principles."
127 There was no dispute that an "offer to sell" was made, but Maersk argued that there was no § 271(a) liability because "the offer was made in Norway, not the United States." 128 Thus, the question before the court was "whether an offer which is made in [a foreign country] by a U.S. company to a U.S. company to sell a product within the U.S., for delivery and use within the U.S. constitutes an offer to sell within the U.S. under § 271(a)." 129 The court concluded that such a scenario does constitute an "offer to sell" under § 271(a). 130 Interestingly, in coming to this conclusion, the court noted that "for an offer to sell to constitute infringement, the offer must be to sell a patented invention within the United States." 131 This holding is notable because it is apparently a departure from the court's previous opinion, in which the court considered "offer to sell" infringement actions where the locations of contemplated sales were outside of the United States.
132
The court went on to state that, when analyzing "offer to sell" infringement, [t]he focus should not be on the location of the offer, but rather the location of the future sale that would occur pursuant to the offer."
133
The court followed the precedent set in 3D Systems concerning the underlying purpose of "offer to sell" infringement: "The underlying purpose of holding someone who offers to sell liable for infringement is to prevent 'generating interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee. '" 134 Further, the court also acknowledged the presumption against extraterritoriality-that under U.S. patent law there is no infringement if the patented product is made or sold in another country 135 -but held that this does not preclude a finding of infringement when there is a foreign offer contemplating a domestic sale. 136 In coming to these conclusions, the court looked at the statute and noted that its language seeks to preclude "offers to sell . . . within the United States."
137
To adopt Maersk USA's position would have us read the statute as "offers made within the United States to sell" or "offers made within the United States to sell within the United States." First, this is not the statutory language. Second, this interpretation would exalt form over substance by allowing a U.S. company to travel abroad to make offers to sell back into the U.S. without any liability for infringement. This company would generate interest in its product in the U.S. to the detriment of the U.S. patent owner, the type of harm that offer to sell within the U.S. liability is meant to remedy. These acts create a real harm in the U.S. to a U.S. patentee. 138 Here, the court again emphasized using the commercial detriment rationale as a primary means of determining whether there is "offer to sell" infringement. 139 In other words, when the actions of an offeror generate interest in a product to the commercial detriment of a U.S. company, a finding of "offer to sell" infringement is much more likely. Two U.S. companies should not be allowed to travel abroad simply to make the offer and avoid infringement, because it is still reasonable that there would be a commercial detriment to the patent holder. Although seemingly in opposition to the court's previous opinions, the Federal Circuit distinguished Transocean from Rotec, MEMC, and SEB. 141 The court explained that none of the holdings in those cases precluded a finding that a foreign agreement between two U.S. companies to sell a product in the United States could constitute infringement. 142 In fact, the court cited Judge Newman's concurrence in Rotec as a source of support for this new holding. 143 Any previous inferences about the Federal Circuit's view on the territorial reach of "offer to sell" infringement should now be viewed in light of the Transocean holding. As the court stated, "[t]he location of the contemplated sale controls whether there is an offer to sell within the United States." 144 As is discussed next, district courts are starting to follow this reasoning. Thus, offers that contemplate sales outside of the United States are now likely not infringing activities under the Transocean rationale.
B. Conflicting Views Among the District Courts
Because there is limited Federal Circuit precedent concerning "offer to sell" infringement, 145 district courts attempting to apply the correct standard to varying factual scenarios have reached diverse and conflicting conclusions. The differing conclusions and the policy rationales advanced by the district courts in reaching those conclusions are the subject of this Section. This muddled state of affairs is contrary to the purpose for which the Federal Circuit was created: to bring uniformity to patent law jurisprudence. 146 In fact, relatively few district cases have addressed transnational "offer to sell" infringement-including domestic offers for foreign sales and foreign offers for domestic sales-so the district courts have not as yet had adequate opportunity to develop a consensus. Even after the 2010 Transocean decision, there remain many gray areas of "offer to sell" infringement-but, as discussed in Part III.B.3, district courts are starting to utilize Transocean's formulation. 
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Infringement Requiring the Contemplated Sale Be Within the United States
A number of district court cases have come to the conclusion that an "offer to sell" made within the United States, when the location of the contemplated sale is outside of the United States, cannot be "offer to sell" patent infringement under § 271(a). 147 The leading case coming to this conclusion is Quality Tubing, Inc. v. Precision Tube Holdings Corp.
148
In Quality Tubing, a contract for sale of a U.S.-patented invention was executed in Texas, but the location of the contemplated sale was in Europe. 149 The District Court for the Southern District of Texas acknowledged that the issue presented by the case was one of first impression: "whether an offer made in the United States to sell products manufactured and delivered outside the United States violates the United States patent laws." 150 The court concluded that § 271(a) only prohibits offers made in the United States that contemplate a sale that would also occur in the United States. 151 In coming to this conclusion, the court cited three principle justifications.
First, the court reasoned that the "offer to sell" infringement statute existed only to increase the temporal scope of when a patentee could assert its rights, not to increase the substantive scope of those rights. 152 The court, similar to Judge Newman's Rotec concurrence, 153 found that "expanding the list of infringing activities . . . to include an 'offer to sell' rather than merely a 'sale' protects a patent holder at an earlier stage of infringing activity."
154 This understanding of the statute requires that for an "offer to sell" to constitute infringement, the contemplated sale itself would have to constitute infringement. 155 Thus, contemplation of a sale that would not result in infringement, for example, a sale that would take place outside of the United States, could not support a finding of "offer to sell" infringement. 156 This reasoning was also supported by the court's finding that an agreement to sell, by itself, could not constitute a sale.
Second, the court concluded that the statute was not meant to expand the extraterritorial rights of the patentee: "This construction does not expand the territorial jurisdiction of the United States patent 159 The court reasoned that finding "offer to sell" infringement when the location of the contemplated sale was outside of the United States "may be an impermissible expansion of the territorial scope of U.S. patent laws." 160 Third, the court found that limiting the scope of the statute would be in the best economic interest of U.S. businesses. 161 The court reasoned that there could be significant uncertainty if an offer for a foreign sale could constitute infringement and that the stricter construction "avoids confusion over whether an offer to sell a product in a foreign market, made during an international telephone call or in an electronic mail transmission, or in a letter mailed in or faxed in the United States, is an act of infringement."
162 Additionally, the court stated that the broader construction would "place a burden on [ 164 In Cybiotronics, the defendant allegedly made offers within the United States to sell an infringing product, but the location of the contemplated sale was in Asia. 165 The District Court for the Central District of California followed similar reasoning to that of the court in Quality Tubing, granting summary judgment to the defendant and holding that when the contemplated sale was not in the United States, there could be no infringement. 166 The Cybiotronics court followed Quality Tubing in reasoning that to hold otherwise would impermissibly extend the territorial scope of the statute, a result that would conflict with the simple purpose of the statute to extend the patentee's rights temporally. 167 trict Court for the District of New Jersey applied the Quality Tubing reasoning to a case where the patentee alleged that the defendant was making infringing "offers to sell" binding assays through its catalogues and website in violation of § 271(a). 169 The analysis of the court in Synaptic, however, is not completely clear and seems somewhat misguided on a number of issues. In particular, the case dealt with patents on "methods and processes, which are typically only infringed by use," making analysis under "offer to sell" infringement appear problematic.
170
The District Court for the Western District of Washington, in Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten, simply denied summary judgment on the issue of "offer to sell" infringement in a case where the defendant was engaged in offering to sell allegedly infringing basketballs through its foreign website to U.S. customers. 171 In doing so, the court did not hold dispositively whether the defendant's actions constituted an "offer to sell," but it did follow the reasoning of Cybiotronics and Quality Tubing, accepting the view that an "offer for sale" must be for a sale that will occur in the United States.
172
In Wing Shing Products (BVI), Ltd. v. Simatelex Manufactory Co., the District Court for the Southern District of New York again addressed a situation where the patentee alleged an offer was made in the United States, contemplating a foreign sale.
173
After dismissing the claim because the court found that there was no offer to sell, however, the court stated that even if there was an offer made within the United States, the "'offer to sell' theory of liability must then fail because the sales contemplated by the offer . . . were intended to occur outside the United States . . . ."
174
The court followed Judge Newman's concurrence from Rotec (which pointed out that " § 271(i) can only be read to mean that in order for an "offer to sell" to infringe under § 271(a), the sale contemplated by the offer 'must be of an item that would infringe the United States patent upon the intended sale'") 175 and reasoned that "by analogy, then, a prohibited 'offer to sell' made within the United States must con- template a prohibited sale, that is, a sale that would also occur in the United States." 176 The court also held that such a reading does not render the addition of the 'offer to sell' language to the statute 'superfluous,' as this language creates a cause of action for direct infringement against an offeror whose offer is never accepted or otherwise consummated by an eventual (independently infringing) sale, a cause of action that did not exist prior to 1996.
177
The District Court for the Northern District of California, in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Chi Mei Optoelectronics Corp., addressed the issue of "offer to sell" infringement in a case where the material facts were not in dispute. 178 The parties basically agreed that there was an offer made within the United States that contemplated a sale outside of the United States. 179 The patentee alleged infringement while the defendant argued the opposite.
180
The court reviewed the competing holdings of various district courts (as has been discussed here and is discussed more infra) 181 and concluded that the issue of the scope of "offer to sell" infringement has not yet been settled. 182 The court noted that although the Federal Circuit appeared to have addressed the question of "whether an offer of sale made in the United States can constitute direct infringement if the product is ultimately sold in a foreign country" in Rotec, there was still division among the courts. 183 The court made use of the Supreme Court's analysis in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. and its strong presumption against extraterritoriality of U.S. patent laws 184 and adopted the Quality Tubing holding, finding that "an 'offer of sale' may constitute direct infringement only if the contemplated sale is to take place within the United States." 185 
Infringement Based Solely on the Parties' Location in the United
States at the Time of the Offer A number of district court cases have come to the conclusion that an "offer to sell" made within the United States can constitute patent infringement under the "offer to sell" provision, no matter the location of the contemplated sale. 186 In ternational Corp., the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania was the first to adopt the position that an offer made in the United States for a contemplated sale in a foreign country could constitute infringement under § 271(a). 187 In this case, the court found that the defendant made an offer in the United States, and the defendant agreed that the sale took place outside of the United States.
188
The court, by dismissing the defendant's motion for summary judgment, implied that an offer contemplating a foreign sale could possibly constitute infringement. 189 The District Court for the District of Delaware, in Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., directly addressed the issue of domestic offers contemplating foreign sales. 190 The Wesley court found that the defendant had made an offer for sale in violation of a previous permanent injunction. 191 A finding as to the scope of "offer to sell" infringement was essential to the court's decision to allow additional discovery concerning infringement. 192 The court held that an "offer to sell" made within the United States is adequate to find infringement: "[A]n unauthorized offer to sell a patented product, which offer is made in the United States, is a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)." 193 In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed Federal Circuit precedent and found that there was support for the proposition that a domestic offer alone is sufficient to support a cause of action. 194 The court stated that "[t]he geographic location and physical destination of the subject matter of the 'offer' appear to be immaterial to the analysis, so long as the 'offer' was made in the United States." 195 Additionally, the court in Wesley rejected the defendant's argument that an "offer to sell" must contemplate an infringing sale within the United States to be infringing under § 271(a).
196 Such a reading, the court held, would make the "offer to sell" language of § 271(a) superfluous, as it would already be encompassed in the "sale" provision of § 271(a).
197
The court also held that the purpose of the "offer for sale" statute required that the patentee be protected from competing offers no matter the location of the contemplated sale. 199 In SEB, the patentee alleged an infringing "offer to sell," and there was substantial evidence that the accused infringer had in fact made an "offer to sell" within the United States.
200
Whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that the contemplated location of the sale was outside of the United States, though, was in dispute. 201 The accused infringer argued that an "offer to sell," when the contemplated sale would occur outside of the United States, would not violate § 271(a).
202
The court concluded, however, that an "offer to sell" made within the United States was sufficient to find "offer to sell" infringement, no matter the location of the contemplated sale. 203 The court followed Wesley's reasoning, emphasizing that a patentee may suffer economic harm even if the contemplated location of a sale is foreign.
204
In TruePosition, Inc. v. Andrew Corp., the District Court for the District of Delaware upheld a jury finding of infringement based in part upon the finding that an offer was made in the United States to sell an infringing product and the contemplated location of the sale was a foreign country. 205 The court did not directly address the issue of the location of the contemplated sale or the scope of "offer to sell" infringement. The court denied the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, however, implying that the court accepted the premise that offers to sell where the contemplated location of the sale is outside of the United States may constitute an infringing act. Since the Federal Circuit decided Transocean, at least two district court decisions in two different districts deal with the issue of transnational "offers to sell." The facts of the two cases differ from those of Transocean, but in both cases the courts have followed the holding in Transocean that the contemplated sale's location controls.
In ION, Inc. v. Sercel, Inc., 210 the Eastern District of Texas faced the opposite situation from that in Transocean.
211 Namely, the court had to decide whether an "offer to sell," made in the United States, which contemplated a sale outside of the United States, fell within § 271(a). 212 It was undisputed that the potentially infringing items "were manufactured, sold, and delivered abroad while the offers for those devices were made in the U.S."
213
The court reviewed the holding of Transocean 214 and acknowledged that the facts of the two cases were different but held that despite the differences, the Federal Circuit was unambiguous when it held that "'the location of the contemplated sale controls whether there is an "offer to sell" within the United States.'" 215 Ultimately, the court held that as a result of the holding of Transocean, the "offers to sell" fell outside the scope of patent law regulation "as a matter of law."
216
In Halo Electronics, Inc. v. Pulse Engineering, Inc., 217 a situation similar to that of ION 218 was before the District Court for the District of Nevada. The defendant, the accused patent infringer, provided evidence that the entirety of the accused products were manufactured outside of the United States and that a majority of the accused products were sold outside of the United States. 219 While the plaintiff provided evidence that pricing discussions took place in the United States, it failed to show that any products were shipped into or sold in the United States. 220 The court followed the holding of Transocean, holding that it is "the location of the contemplated sale that determines whether an offer to sell is made in the United States." 224 the conflicting views among the district courts concerning the scope of "offer to sell" infringement, 225 and the Federal Circuit's seeming departure in Transocean from previous precedent, 226 some clarification and unambiguous guidance seem to be necessary. A number of policies have been discussed that might inform the proper scope of the "offer to sell" provision of § 271(a), but it is yet to be fully defined by the Federal Circuit. What, for example, should be the result when two foreign corporations make a foreign offer that contemplates a sale in the United States or when two corporations make a domestic offer contemplating a sale in a foreign country? In order to provide clear guidance to the courts, this Note proposes a rule-the "Location of the Contemplated Sale" rule-that, if adopted, would clearly guide the courts on the proper scope of "offer to sell" infringement in all circumstances.
The "Location of the Contemplated Sale" rule [hereinafter LCS rule] follows from, and extends, the Federal Circuit's analysis in Transocean, and is thus an apparent departure from the court's earlier precedent. 227 The LCS rule can be stated as follows: if the location of the contemplated sale is within the United States, there is potential for "offer to sell" infringement, regardless of the nationality or locations of the parties; otherwise, there is not. Under this rule, the location of the contemplated sale is the controlling, preliminary step in a court's analysis of "offer to sell" infringement under § 271. It is a gateway that can be utilized by the court to filter out claims that do not fall within the scope of this type of infringement.
The LCS rule follows the precedent the Federal Circuit has now set with respect to "offer to sell" infringement, but it goes a step further. 228 The Federal Circuit, in the most recent case addressing this issue, Transocean, stated that "the location of the contemplated sale controls wheth- 230 In Transocean, the court found that two U.S. companies that had made an offer outside of the United States but contemplated a sale within the United States were liable for "offer to sell" infringement. 231 What is not clear is what would occur if the two companies were foreign companies or if the offer was made in the United States, contemplating a sale outside of the United States. Under the proposed rule, liability for infringement exists regardless of the status of the parties or companies that make the offer and regardless of the location of the parties when the offer is made.
The LCS rule and Transocean are departures from the Federal Circuit's earlier analysis, as offers involving contemplated sales outside of the United States would no longer fall within the scope of § 271(a) "offers to sell." 232 In Transocean, the Federal Circuit followed Judge Newman's Rotec concurrence in requiring that "the offer must be to sell a patented invention within the United States."
233 This is apparently in opposition to the majority view in Rotec and MEMC, where the Federal Circuit proceeded to analyze the cases for possible "offer to sell" infringement despite the fact that apparently all contemplated sales were to take place outside of the United States. 234 The proposed rule eliminates this ambiguity and the need for courts to analyze such a case when the contemplated sale is clearly outside of the United States. If the court finds that the contemplated sale is foreign, then the court should conclude that there is no "offer to sell" infringement. The LCS rule thus greatly simplifies the required analysis and removes ambiguity concerning the scope of this type of infringement.
235
The LCS rule also has the advantage of respecting the extraterritoriality principles that the Federal Circuit has articulated. Under the presumption against extraterritoriality, the patent laws of the United States only reach acts of infringement if the patented product is made or sold within the United States. 236 Under this presumption, sales made outside of the United States of U.S.-patented products are not acts of infringement. 237 Likewise, an "offer to sell" a patented product when the con- 238 The LCS rule respects this presumption by requiring an expectation that the contemplated sale will take place within the United States for there to be any liability for infringement.
It might be argued that the rule's inclusion of "offers to sell" that take place outside of the United States does not respect the presumption against extraterritoriality, because it proposes a possible finding of liability for an act that took place outside of the United States. 239 While this view holds some merit, it is incorrect for two reasons. First, only offers that contemplate sales within the United States have potential liability for infringement. 240 The proper application of the LCS rule thus maintains that liability is incurred only when there is a contemplated act that certainly falls within the jurisdiction of the United States. To allow for the opposite result would be to enable two U.S. companies simply to travel abroad temporarily to avoid liability under the "offer to sell" infringement provision. The Federal Circuit has explicitly rejected this proposition. 241 Second, Congress's addition of "offer to sell" infringement arose as part of an international treaty to harmonize patent protections across many countries, 242 and thus some degree of extraterritorial reach is expected and appropriate.
243 Inherent in the existence of an international treaty is the acknowledgement that patent protections need to be dealt with on an international scale. 244 With the globalization of commerce today, harmony between countries over the protections afforded to patentees is a very desirable goal, as it gives patentees, as well as potential infringers, notice of exactly what their rights are and what actions do and do not incur liability. 245 Harmonization of global patent laws has the potential to lead to simplification, and the proposed LCS rule, if adopted internationally, would achieve this. Under this rule, a potential infringer would be on notice that, no matter its nationality or location, if it makes an offer to sell a U.S.-patented device, and the location of the contemplated sale is in the United States, it is potentially infringing the U.S. patent. Likewise, a potential infringer of a U.K.-patented device would be on notice that any action it takes to make an offer to sell, when the location of the contemplated sale would be within the United Kingdom, has 238 . See Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 ("In order for an offer to sell to constitute infringement, the offer must be to sell a patented invention within the United States.").
239. This would be because an "offer to sell" that takes place in a foreign country is, by itself, literally an act that did not take place in the United States. Generally, U.S. patent law imposes no liability for acts that take place wholly outside the country, even if those acts include making and selling a U.S. potential liability for infringement under the United Kingdom's analogous "offer to sell" infringement provision. 246 If adopted internationally, this rule would ensure that no potential infringer would have the ability to simply temporarily go to another country to avoid infringement, and the presumption against extraterritoriality would be respected.
The LCS rule also respects the Federal Circuit's policy rationale for § 271(a) "offer to sell" infringement.
247
The Federal Circuit has stated that "[t]he underlying purpose of holding someone who offers to sell liable for infringement is to prevent 'generating interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial detriment of the rightful patentee.'" 248 The proposed rule logically supports this purpose by requiring that the location of the contemplated sale be within the United States. This is because, in accordance with the presumption against extraterritoriality, a patentee's rights do not extend beyond the jurisdiction of the United States, and so a potentially infringing product is by definition one that exists in the United States. 249 Logically, then, "generating interest in a potential infringing product" must take place in the United States. 250 No commercial detriment will exist when the product at issue is outside of the United States or when the proposed location of the sale is outside of the United States because there will be no generation of interest within the United States. As the proposed rule always requires the location of the sale to be within the United States, there will always be the possibility of commercial detriment.
The presumption against extraterritoriality comes into play here, again, when considering commercial detriment. It could be argued that due to the global nature of today's economy and the ease and speed of transportation, any offer with a contemplated sale in any location of the world has the potential to generate interest to the commercial detriment of the U.S. patent holder. 251 The Supreme Court has at times used this reasoning in other areas of the law, such as trademark and antitrust, and it is generally known as the "Effects-Based Approach." UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2012 mercial detriment policy seems artificially confined to the United States. While there is some truth to this, it also must be acknowledged that as long as there are many different nations in the world, with different laws and legal systems, territoriality must come into play. 253 To hold potential infringers liable in the United States for acts that have highly attenuated links to anything going on in the United States-such as a foreign offer for a foreign sale-directly opposes the presumption against extraterritoriality. 254 Thus, the line must be drawn somewhere, and the LCS rule provides clear guidance on liability that gives notice to potential infringers and simplifies the issue for courts. Patent holders who feel they need patent protection that extends to sales in other countries have the option of seeking patent protection in those countries. Liability for infringement of a U.S. patent cannot reasonably be extended to every other country in the world.
Thus, the LCS rule provides a clear guide for courts struggling to find the proper scope of "offer to sell" infringement under § 271(a). It follows the reasoning of the Federal Circuit in the most recent case dealing with "offer to sell" infringement, Transocean.
255 It respects the presumption against extraterritoriality articulated by the Federal Circuit 256 and is in line with the policy rationale underlying the existence of "offer to sell" infringement. 257 Adoption of this rule has the potential to clarify the bounds of "offer to sell" infringement and provide clear notice to potential infringers.
V. CONCLUSION
The scope and bounds of liability for transnational "offer to sell" patent infringement is currently unclear. Properly construing the "offer to sell" provision of § 271(a) is important for giving notice to patent owners and potential infringers as to what activities are potentially infringing. The "offer to sell" provision of the patent infringement statute came into being as part of an effort to harmonize international patent laws, but a lack of legislative history leaves many questions unanswered as to the statute's intended scope. 258 Even after the holding in Transocean, many questions still remain.
This Note proposes an extension of the Federal Circuit's Transocean holding in the form of a clear rule: the "Location of the Contemplated Sale" rule. 259 This rule states that in all "offer to sell" infringement cases, the location of the contemplated sale controls and requires that the sale location be within the United States. Thus, two foreign companies who make a foreign offer, contemplating sales in the United States, would be liable under the "offer to sell" infringement provision in the United States. Further, two companies which make an offer in the United States, but which contemplate a foreign sale, would not be liable. This rule is in line with the Federal Circuit's holding in Transocean, and it respects the underlying policies of the statute and the presumption against extraterritoriality in the modern global marketplace. Post-Transocean district court cases now seem to be adopting this type of rule when dealing with potential transnational "offer to sell" infringement.
260
The scope of "offer to sell" infringement must eventually be clarified. It is in the public interest to clearly define the scope of a patent owner's right to exclude. A clear rule will be of the greatest benefit to all potential parties, as it reduces ambiguity and puts all parties on notice as to what actions create liability for patent infringement. The decision as to what rule to adopt will require balancing the justifications and policy considerations presented in this Note. As inventions become ever more international and the marketplace becomes more global, the urgency to clarify this issue will continue to increase. Adoption of the "Location of the Contemplated Sale" rule, both in the United States and internationally, would provide much-needed certainty and clarity to this area of law. 260 . See supra Part III.B.3.
